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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 14242

RAYMOND GLENN DODGE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a criminal action charging appellant
with the offense of Aggravated Robbery.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury.

From a verdict

of guilty to the charge of Aggravated Robbery, the
defendant appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment, and
a judgment of acquittal in his favor as a matter of law.
In the alternative, appellant would seek to have the
judgment set aside and be granted a new trial.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was tried jointly with two other defendants , Diane Jewell Lobato and Lawrence Arthur Morgan.

A

Motion for mistrial was granted as to defendant Lobato
near the conclusion of trial proceedings.

Defendant Morgan

was found guilty by jury verdict of Aggravated Robbery.
The robbery charges stem from incidents occurring
at the Ming Restaurant in Granger, Utah, during the early
hours of June 11, 1975,

The prosecution's evidence con-

sisted of the testimony of six witnesses and the introduction
of the prosecution's case, and subsequent to its opening
statement, the six prosecution witnesses were sworn, were
instructed to wait outside of the courtroom to testify
until called pursuant to the exclusion rule, and were
admonished not to discuss the case while waiting outside
during the trial, both before and after giving testimony.
The oath of testimony, instruction as to the exclusion
rule, and admonition not to discuss the case was each
administered by the court (Record, p. 65, In. 25 to
p. 66, In. 14) pursuant to request by defense counsel.
The first witness was Rhea Selvadge, the cashier
at the restaurant and victim of the holdup.

In her testi-

mony (Record, p. 66-93), she identified defendant Morgan
as the perpetrator of the offense and claimed the amount
taken was $582.

She did not identify defendant Dodge,

but referred to "another gentleman" who entered the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

restaurant while the holdup was in process, told defendant
Morgan "hurry," and helped carry the money out (p. 69,
In. 18 to p. 70, In. 3). She was able to describe the
second person as male, white, but dark colored with
extremely dark hair, five feet eight inches tall, and
150 pounds (p. 70, In. 28 to p. 71, In. 9, p. 87, In.
13-20).

She was unable to describe the clothing worn by

the second man (p. 78, In. 17-26, p. 81, In. 29 to p. 82,
In. 4 ) , but noticed that he was nervous (p. 79, In.
19-22) , and was standing "as close as he could possibly
get" to defendant Morgan (p. 80, In. 7 to p. 81, In. 1,
p. 86, In. 27-29, p. 87, In. 2-12) for approximately 20
seconds.

She also mentioned that "one of the gentlemen"

wore wire rim glasses (p. 82, In. 16-19, p. 87, In. 21-25,
p. 88, In. 4-7, 15-16), but was not sure as to which one.
She did not detect the second man to be armed (p. 86, In.
30 to p. 87, In. 1 ) . She did not see either man leave
the restaurant (p. 88, In. 17-29), nor did she see either
of them again that night.
The court recessed for lunch after witness
Selvadge's testimony.

It reconvened after lunch in

chambers, where counsel moved the court to grant a mistrial on the basis of misconduct by the prosecution's
witnesses.

The misconduct consisted of all of the State's

witnesses freely and openly discussing their testimony
together, which was observed by defense counsel (Record,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by defense counsel included identification, eyeglasses and
time (p. 94, In. 21-27; p. 95, In. 3-7, In. 26-28).

Such

discussions had been expressly forbidden by the court in
its previous admonition to the witnesses after taking the
oath of testimony.

The motion was argued to the court

by respective counsel (p. 94-100), and was taken under
advisement by the court.

After the State rested its case,

the motion was renewed and argued (p. 187-190), and again
taken under advisement.

The court later denied the motion

(p. 196, In. 5-7).
The second witness was Donna Lynn Shortino, a
waitress working at the Ming Restaurant during the commission of the holdup.

She testified that she informed

Ned Frandson of the holdup and that they went outside the
restaurant (Record, p. 102, In. 6-11) . She stated her
observation of a gold car pulling out of the driveway
(p. 102, In. 12 to p. 103, In. 1 ) , the driver of the car
(p. 107, In. 21-25), and "possibly two" head shadows
(p. 108, In. 2-14), but was unable to make any identification.
She admitted that the prosecution witnesses discussed the
case together during the noon recess (p. 109, In. 25 to
p. 110, In. 6), including witness Selvadge, who had already
testified.
The third witness was Ned M. Frandson, a Salt
Lake County Deputy Sheriff, who was at the cafe having
coffee while off duty (Record, p. 110, In. 26 to p. Ill, In.5).
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He testified that he had a conversation with witness Shortino,
went outside of the restaurant

. . . 11, In. 6- 18) , and

observed three moving cars in the parking lot (p. 131 , 1 r
22 to p. 1 12, li: :i 5).

His at tent ion was drawn to one of

the three cars, which he described as brown or gold, medium
sized, with square taillights (p. 112, In. 6-25).

He

stated that his description of the car was broadcast over
a police radio report, which later included a description
o £ three suspec t s :

(1)

Wh i te ma 1 e Amer Ic an, 6f 2"

30-32

y e a r s , blond h a i r , collar l e n g t h , blond m u s t a c h e , brown
jacket a nd si a c k s ;

(2)

white male American, 5f 10-11",

approximately 30-32 y e a r s , dark h a i r ; a n d
n o basic d e s c r i p t i o n

(3)

woman,

(p. 1 1 2 , In. 26 t o p . 1 1 3 , In. 2 3 ) .

He claimed to have obtained the descriptions from Sherry
Snyder and Gayle L l e w e l y n after he h a d left t h e r e s t a u r a n t
(p. 11 S, ,! n

1 3 i .o p . 1 1 6 , In , 18) .

He, too, submitted

that the witnesses discussed the case together during the
noon recess (p. 119, In. 2-24).
The fourth wi tness was S

A. Twitchell

*

. -i

also a Sal t Lake County Deputy Sheriff, who was on dut •in the general area at the time of the holdup.

He testi-

fied as to receiving witness Frandson's radio broadcast,
and to stopping a gold Duster automobile with square
taillights (Record, p. 1 21-122) , a. t id Identified the
occupants of the car to be defendants Lobato, Morgan and
Dodge.

He testified that appellant was seated in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rear of the car (p. 122, In. 8) . He arrested each of the
defendants.

He testified as to recovering a purse from

the right front floor (p. 138, In. 22 to p. 139, In. 6)
containing approximately $580.

The money was offered in

evidence, but when counted amounted to $492 (p. 158, In.
19-24).

Witness Twitchell was later recalled to testify.

He stated that there was no description broadcast on the
radio dispatch of the second man (p. 167, In. 4-15), and
that when appellant was arrested he did not have any
glasses (p. 169, In. 7-10, 21-24) . He had earlier testified that defendant Morgan did not have glasses when he
was arrested (p. 152, In. 21-23).

Following his testimony,

the money ($492) was offered in evidence and received over
the objection by defense counsel that the variance in
amount from that claimed in testimony by witnesses Twitchell
($580) and Selvadge ($582) was substantial and critical,
rendering the evidence irrelevant (p. 175, In. 16-30).
The fifth witness was James Luff, a Salt Lake
County Deputy Sheriff who was also at the scene of the
arrest of defendants, arriving after they had been stopped
by Officer Twitchell.

He saw the money in the purse

(Record, p. 161, In. 6-11), but did not offer any testimony
which would connect appellant to the holdup.
The sixth witness was Gayle Llewelyn, a customer
in the Ming Restaurant during the commission of the holdup.
She identified defendant Morgan as a man she saw walking
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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into a restaurant bathroom with gloves on, and observed a
girl in the parking lot in a Duster automobile, that she
could not identify.

She stated that a Sherry Snyder was

with her throughout the time in question, and that they
followed Officer Frandson leaving the restaurant in their
ar until he was overtaken and stopped, where Ms, Snyder
gave a description to him.
that she did

Witness Llewelyn testified

not sec ti second man

(Record, p. 179, In,

13-14) , nor did she give Officer Frandson a description
of a second man (p. 18 0, In. 6-12;
all (p. 182 f In. 10-2).

. •*

ceseripti en at

She did not. notice glasses worn

by defendant Morgan (p. 181, ln„ 30 to p. 182, In. ±j .
At the conelusi on of her t ,est imony, the state rested its
case.
A session was conducted o\ it c f the hearing" of the
jury in chambers.

Counsel for appellant renewed his motion

for mistrial on the basis of misconduct by the prosecution
- • " r.e 5scs ( Record , p , I H 7 -1 90 )

and a motion to dismiss

•^ *:c appellant for lack of evidence (p„ 192-194) .

Both

motions were taken under advisement, and later denied
(p

196)

After a brief recall of witness Selvadge, who

offered testimony describing the first man, the defense
rested its case,, •'
During closing arguments, the counsel for the
prosecution summarized the testimony offpred

in the case f

claiming that witness Selvadge identified appellant
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(Record, p. 199, In. 26-30), to which defense counsel
objected to the claim (p. 200, In. 1-4) . At no time was
any evidence introduced which identified appellant as
having directly participated in the commission of the
holdup, save the assertion by the prosecution in its
opening statement that witness Selvadge would identify
appellant (Record, p. 63, In. 2-5), which in fact never
occurred.
The jury found appellant guilty of Aggravated
Robbery on the same day.

On August 13, 1975, counsel for

appellant submitted a motion for new trial or in the
alternative for arrest of judgment on two grounds:

(1)

that

it was error to deny the motion for mistrial as to the misconduct of the witnesses in violation of the exclusion rule
and the admonition of the witness; and
dict was contrary to the evidence.

(2)

that the ver-

The motions were denied

by the court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

IN THAT THE VERDICT OF GUILTY TO AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY WAS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTfS
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-6-302 (1973) sets

forth the elements which are essential to a showing of
Aggravated Robbery:
Aggravated Robbery.—(1) A person commits
aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery,
he: J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(a) Uses a firearm or a fascimile
of a firearm, knife or a facsilime of a
knife or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury
upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of
the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an
act shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery "if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of f
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
A careful examination of the record below demonstrates
that the evidence presented does not support a conviction of
Aggravated Robbery,

Appellant W H S not identified as being

present at the scene of the alleged holdup.

When the auto-

mobile was stopped by police with the three defendants
inside, appellant was found not to be driving the car, not
in possession of a firearm, knife or deadly weapon, and
not in possession of the allegedly stolen property.

He

was not found to be wearing or in the possession of glasses.
While the testimony was conflicting, none of the witnesses
offered by prosecution were able to determine how many
persons were in the ear as it left the restaurant, much
less as to whether appellant was Inside.,

Wh ile one witness

did testify circumstantially that there was a second man,
her description of him did not fit appellant

-or ^ r

>ne

able to identity appellant as the second man, although she
stated that the second man stood immediately next to
another man which she was able to identify.

She was able

to discern that this second man was not armed, in any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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case.

There was no showing of any serious bodily injury

inflicted by appellant or the other defendants upon anyone.
Thus there was no evidence with respect to appellant to
tie him in except for his being in a vehicle after a
robbery occurs which is stopped by the police with two
other people who allegedly were involved in a holdup.
While the evidence presented may have supported a showing
of some other offense, it clearly does not show that
appellant committed an aggravated robbery.
Utah Code Annotated Sections 77-38-3(6) and
77-34-1 (1953 as amended) set forth the grounds necessary
for a person convicted of a criminal offense to have the
conviction either set aside for new trial, or to have the
judgment arrested.

Appellant submits that, upon th€>

evidence presented at trial, the elements for new trial
or arrest of judgment were present sufficiently that is was
error for the court not to grant appellant's motion.
POINT II:

IN THAT THE STATE'S WITNESSES COMMITTED
MISCONDUCT IN VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION
RULE AND THE ADMONITION IMPOSED BY THE
COURT, IT WAS ERROR TO DENY APPELLANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
There are two statutory provisions in Utah which

concern the exclusion rule.

The first is Utah Code

Annotated Section 78-7-4 (1953 as amended), which provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
Right to exclude in certain cases.—
...; and in any cause the court may, in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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its discretion, during the examination of
a witness exclude any and all other witnesses
in the cause.
The second reference is found in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 43(f), on evidence, which provides:
Exclusion of witnesses. Upon motion
of either party, the court shall exclude
from the courtroom any witness of the adverse
party, not at the time under examination, so
that he may not hear the testimony of the
other witnesses.
While there is some case law in Utah interpreting
these provisions, it does not concern the question presented
here on appeal.

Thus a question of first impression is

presented to this Court.
To briefly review the facts of the case, the six
prosecution witnesses were sworn in to testify jointly,
and then were instructed by the court to

(1)

wait out-

side of the courtroom until called to testify, and

(2)

not discuss the case during the course of the trial.

The

witnesses did in fact discuss the case collectively outside
the courtroom during a recess, as is evidenced by the
record generally, and in the specific admission by some
of the witnesses in testimony.

The question presented is

this, does this sort of witness misconduct warrant the
granting of a new trial, or for arrest of judgment.
The admonition of the witnesses not to discuss
the case is an integral part of the exclusion rule.
Without such an admonition, the purpose of the rule is
frustrated.
What is offensive in the present case is the
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

repetition of testimony by one witness who had testified to
the witnesses that were going to testify and the discussions
between all of the prosecution witnesses, after being
expressly admonished not to do so by the court.

If the

exclusionary rule has any meaning at allf it means that
such discussions are forbidden and that witnesses do not
compare their stories during the course of a trial.
It is not possible to recite all of the details
of the discussion between the witnesses, although some
matters included in the conversation are revealed in the
record.

However, the very comparison of stories is

suggestive in itself, and thus it should not be the burden
of a criminal defendant to demonstrate the damage caused
by the conversation.

The proper test is whether it is

likely that the misconduct had the effect of tainting the
evidence such that it might not be possible to be afforded
a fair trial.

The burden is to show the likelihood of

such an effect, and not the practically impossible burden
of showing actual damage.
In rebuttal to these arguments, the State has
pointed out that the prosecution attorney was present
during the discussion, and that the conversation occurred
at his direction.

This in turn somehow removes the likeli-

hood that the evidence will be tainted.

Appellant would con-

tend that the position of the State is unfeasible.

These

arguments reveal that the prosecution actively participated
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in conduct expressly forbidden in the court's admonition.
For the exclusion rule to have a valid position in our
criminal justice system, it should be interpreted to require
discussions between counsel and witnesses be conducted
singularly during the course of trial, such as to avoid
the fabrication and/or collaboration of similar testimony.
Any other interpretation will render the exclusion rule a
nullity.
CONCLUSION
Due to the lack of evidence showing that appellant
committed aggravated robbery, it is submitted that his
conviction should be reversed, and either a new trial
granted or the judgment arrested.

Due to the misconduct of

the prosecution witnesses in the face of a direct admonition
by the court not to engage in such conduct, it is submitted
that appellant should be granted a new trial
Respectfully submitted,

"^.&S^
D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney for Appellant
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